The Failure Of The FBI’s Virtual Case File Project





Between 2001 and 2005, the FBI’s Virtual Case File scheme failed. The Virtual Case File project was part of a larger initiative called Trilogy. Costs overran by 89% or just over $200M. A cast that should have taken 3 years, failed after 4 years through requirements still not met. This analysis draws on a very detailed account from the Office of the Inspector General, but here we point of concentration explicitly on the project management failings.

The FBI’s Trilogy design contained three parts:

Upgrading software and hardware for FBI agents

Upgrading the FBI’s communications reticulated 

Significantly upgrading the FBI’s case management system (Virtual Case File) to make capable better access to, and sharing of, case-related information across the FBI

The ~ and foremost two elements of the project were completed, not perfectly or entirely that impressively, but roughly as planned. However, the Virtual Case File purpose experienced major cost and schedule overruns and never achieved its objectives. It is widely used as an example of a failed IT project.

Vague and inappropriate requirements

As through all the cases of project failure that this blog has explored (the Sydney Opera House, the 2010 Census and the H1N1 vaccination program) the affections of the problem is vague requirements. “Trilogy’s design requirements were depravity-defined and evolving as the project progressed.”

 

Scope creep

It’s it may be inappropriate to use the term scope creep for a project at what place scope is never clearly defined. But the September 11 attacks and reports into the Oklahoma City bombings in March 2002 increased urgency on the project to produce results faster (regardless of what was truly feasible). In addition, the Hanssen espionage case, one of the in the greatest degree significant in the FBI’s history, raised the bar for security requirements for the Virtual Case File system. According to one make known on the project. “Trilogy’s scope grew by about 80 percent inasmuch as initiation of the project.” If the scope is increasing faster than drudge is being complete, it will be impossible for any project to perfect.

Scheduling by desired outcomes rather than resource based estimates

I conclude as this as the King Canute approach to project management, proper because you’re a powerful executive and you want something to be complete faster than 3 years, does not mean that that is possible given the scope of work and resources allocated. However, the scheduling since the Virtual Case File project focused on what was desired, rather than what was possible. Two quotes from the report appear to make clear this:

“The FBI also developed plans to accelerate the completion of Trilogy on this account that at the time the project’s 3-year modernization timeframe was considered too long.”

“The contractor disagreed with the resulting schedules, because the schedules showed that the abounding implementation of the project exceeded the proposed completion date of the exhibit.”

 Cost plus contracting

The interests of the FBI and the contractors working on the project were not aligned. “The cost-plus-award-absolute title type of contract used for Trilogy…did not require specific perfecting  milestones…and..did not provide for penalties if the milestones were not met.” Arguably, this is a determination of vague scope, but the use of cost plus pricing, made it ~-hearted for the FBI to hold their contractors accountable.

 

Lack of undefiled ownership

A project manager was appointed only late into the design, the FBI cycled through 5 people in the CIO role in 4 years and in that place was “decision making by committees instead of knowledgeable individuals.” In adding to a lack of accountability at the contractor level, there was a destitution for clearer accountability within the FBI.

See more analysis of jut failure here









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